> WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40 / Must Read ( Very Long
> Typing)

> 116523.  koi    View profile
>   (1 user)  More options Jul 3, 7:24 pm

> From: koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com>
> Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2009 19:24:10 -0700 (PDT)
> Local: Fri, Jul 3 2009 7:24 pm
> Subject: WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40 / Must Read ( Very
> Long Typing)
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> WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> you-
> man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> the bank's IP assets.

> Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> Business

> Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> http://wamuqd.com/

> Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> it
> quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> Supervision
> (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> insufficient
> liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> seized.
> The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> of September, 2008.

> Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> WaMu.
> For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> the
> vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> negotiated
> a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> plan
> will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> acceleration
> of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> These
> accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> were
> mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> was
> likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> The
> withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> nation,
> and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> draw down.

> A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> its
> doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> they
> do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> known
> as a bank panic.

> In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> all
> at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> the
> FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> for
> creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> supply
> side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> corporation whose stockholders are the biggest banks in the country.
> The Chairman and the six Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
> are
> all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This is
> the legal extent of the Governments involvement with the Federal
> Reserve. Thus the government has weak control over the actions of the
> Federal Reserve. All banks in America are members of the Federal
> Reserve System. All paper money is printed by the Treasury per the
> amounts ordered by the Federal Reserve. All electronic money, wires,
> credit cards, debit cards etc and all check book money, is under the
> monetary policies of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve
> controls
> how much money, (cash, electronic, check book) banks have on hand
> through its regulations and membership requirements. It maintains
> this
> flexibility so that it may meet the liquidity demands of banks.

> WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> you-
> man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> the bank's IP assets.

> Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> Business

> Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> http://wamuqd.com/

> Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> it
> quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> Supervision
> (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> insufficient
> liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> seized.
> The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> of September, 2008.

> Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> WaMu.
> For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> the
> vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> negotiated
> a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> plan
> will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> acceleration
> of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> These
> accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> were
> mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> was
> likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> The
> withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> nation,
> and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> draw down.

> A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> its
> doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> they
> do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> known
> as a bank panic.

> In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> all
> at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> the
> FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> for
> creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> supply
> side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> corporation whose stockholders are the biggest banks in the country.
> The Chairman and the six Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
> are
> all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This is
> the legal extent of the Governments involvement with the Federal
> Reserve. Thus the government has weak control over the actions of the
> Federal Reserve. All banks in America are members of the Federal
> Reserve System. All paper money is printed by the Treasury per the
> amounts ordered by the Federal Reserve. All electronic money, wires,
> credit cards, debit cards etc and all check book money, is under the
> monetary policies of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve
> controls
> how much money, (cash, electronic, check book) banks have on hand
> through its regulations and membership requirements. It maintains
> this
> flexibility so that it may meet the liquidity demands of banks.

> WaMu was the largest thrift in America and part of the Federal
> Reserve
> System. WaMu had some no pay and slow pay mortgage loans, like most
> banks in America today. These loans were not an overwhelming problem
> for WaMu, as they had enough cash reserves on hand to last two years
> at the current bad loan rate.

> On March 10, 2000 the Dot Com bubble burst. The Federal Reserve began
> lowering interest rates to make borrowing more attractive, to

> WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> you-
> man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> the bank's IP assets.

> Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> Business

> Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> http://wamuqd.com/

> Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> it
> quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> Supervision
> (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> insufficient
> liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> seized.
> The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> of September, 2008.

> Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> WaMu.
> For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> the
> vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> negotiated
> a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> plan
> will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> acceleration
> of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> These
> accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> were
> mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> was
> likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> The
> withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> nation,
> and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> draw down.

> A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> its
> doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> they
> do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> known
> as a bank panic.

> In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> all
> at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> the
> FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> for
> creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> supply
> side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> corporation whose stockholders are the biggest banks in the country.
> The Chairman and the six Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
> are
> all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This is
> the legal extent of the Governments involvement with the Federal
> Reserve. Thus the government has weak control over the actions of the
> Federal Reserve. All banks in America are members of the Federal
> Reserve System. All paper money is printed by the Treasury per the
> amounts ordered by the Federal Reserve. All electronic money, wires,
> credit cards, debit cards etc and all check book money, is under the
> monetary policies of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve
> controls
> how much money, (cash, electronic, check book) banks have on hand
> through its regulations and membership requirements. It maintains
> this
> flexibility so that it may meet the liquidity demands of banks.

> WaMu was the largest thrift in America and part of the Federal
> Reserve
> System. WaMu had some no pay and slow pay mortgage loans, like most
> banks in America today. These loans were not an overwhelming problem
> for WaMu, as they had enough cash reserves on hand to last two years
> at the current bad loan rate.

> On March 10, 2000 the Dot Com bubble

> The demise of Washington Mutual
> There's a detailed story in today's New York Times about just how
> Washington Mutual sowed the seeds of its own demise. As I read this
> story, I thought, "It's pretty clear to me that many criminals aren't
> in prison -- they're still working in mortgage banking." Apparently
> you have a much higher chance of being sent to prison for a drug-
> related offense in the U.S. than you do for ripping off people in
> various mortgage scams. Welcome to the 21st century! From the story:

> At WaMu, getting the job done meant lending money to nearly anyone who
> asked for it — the force behind the bank’s meteoric rise and its
> precipitous collapse this year in the biggest bank failure in American
> history.

> On a financial landscape littered with wreckage, WaMu, a Seattle-based
> bank that opened branches at a clip worthy of a fast-food chain,
> stands out as a singularly brazen case of lax lending. By the first
> half of this year, the value of its bad loans had reached $11.5
> billion, nearly tripling from $4.2 billion a year earlier.

> Interviews with two dozen former employees, mortgage brokers, real
> estate agents and appraisers reveal the relentless pressure to churn
> out loans that produced such results. While that sample may not fully
> represent a bank with tens of thousands of people, it does reflect the
> views of employees in WaMu mortgage operations in California, Florida,
> Illinois and Texas.

> Their accounts are consistent with those of 89 other former employees
> who are confidential witnesses in a class action filed against WaMu in
> federal court in Seattle by former shareholders...
> Some WaMu employees who worked for the bank during the boom now have
> regrets.

> “It was a disgrace,” said Dana Zweibel, a former financial
> representative at a WaMu branch in Tampa, Fla. “We were giving loans
> to people that never should have had loans.”

> If Ms. Zweibel doubted whether customers could pay, supervisors
> directed her to keep selling, she said.

> “We were told from up above that that’s not our concern,” she said.
> “Our concern is just to write the loan.”...
> WaMu’s boiler room culture flourished in Southern California, where
> housing prices rose so rapidly during the bubble that creative
> financing was needed to attract buyers.

> To that end, WaMu embraced so-called option ARMs, adjustable rate
> mortgages that enticed borrowers with a selection of low initial rates
> and allowed them to decide how much to pay each month. But people who
> opted for minimum payments were underpaying the interest due and
> adding to their principal, eventually causing loan payments to
> balloon.

> Customers were often left with the impression that low payments would
> continue long term, according to former WaMu sales agents.

> For WaMu, variable-rate loans — option ARMs, in particular — were
> especially attractive because they carried higher fees than other
> loans, and allowed WaMu to book profits on interest payments that
> borrowers deferred. Because WaMu was selling many of its loans to
> investors, it did not worry about defaults: by the time loans went
> bad, they were often in other hands...

> Washington Mutual Gives $615,000 Mortgage To Immigrant Making $9 An
> Hour Who Can't Read Or Write English
> By Digger

> Soledad Aviles, an immigrant from Mexico with a 6th grade education
> who can't read or write English and makes $9 an hour, was approved for
> a mortgage of $615, 000 by Washington Mutual. It should be noted off
> the bat that Washington Mutual is one of many banks that accept the
> Matricula Consular ID card as proof of identity and which is easily
> forgable. I assume Aviles is not an illegal alien (but who knows
> considering the source of this story and the fact that they like to
> omit those little tidbits all of the time).

> Soledad Aviles and his wife Guadalupe
> The LA Times gives us his sad story below as he is forced to then rent
> out his house to illegal aliens to make the payments and sleep on a
> couch.
> Washington Mutual should be brought up on charges along with all of
> the people who touched this mortgage and put it through. All those
> living at the residence who are illegal, including Aviles and his wife
> if found to be so, should be deported and the house should be seized
> and sold off at auction with all proceeds going towards the border
> fence, interior enforcement and the prosecution of businesses who hire
> and make loans to illegal aliens.

> The demise of Washington Mutual
> There's a detailed story in today's New York Times about just how
> Washington Mutual sowed the seeds of its own demise. As I read this
> story, I thought, "It's pretty clear to me that many criminals aren't
> in prison -- they're still working in mortgage banking." Apparently
> you have a much higher chance of being sent to prison for a drug-
> related offense in the U.S. than you do for ripping off people in
> various mortgage scams. Welcome to the 21st century! From the story:

> At WaMu, getting the job done meant lending money to nearly anyone who
> asked for it — the force behind the bank’s meteoric rise and its
> precipitous collapse this year in the biggest bank failure in American
> history.

> On a financial landscape littered with wreckage, WaMu, a Seattle-based
> bank that opened branches at a clip worthy of a fast-food chain,
> stands out as a singularly brazen case of lax lending. By the first
> half of this year, the value of its bad loans had reached $11.5
> billion, nearly tripling from $4.2 billion a year earlier.

> Interviews with two dozen former employees, mortgage brokers, real
> estate agents and appraisers reveal the relentless pressure to churn
> out loans that produced such results. While that sample may not fully
> represent a bank with tens of thousands of people, it does reflect the
> views of employees in WaMu mortgage operations in California, Florida,
> Illinois and Texas.

> Their accounts are consistent with those of 89 other former employees
> who are confidential witnesses in a class action filed against WaMu in
> federal court in Seattle by former shareholders...
> Some WaMu employees who worked for the bank during the boom now have
> regrets.

> “It was a disgrace,” said Dana Zweibel, a former financial
> representative at a WaMu branch in Tampa, Fla. “We were giving loans
> to people that never should have had loans.”

> If Ms. Zweibel doubted whether customers could pay, supervisors
> directed her to keep selling, she said.

> “We were told from up above that that’s not our concern,” she said.
> “Our concern is just to write the loan.”...
> WaMu’s boiler room culture flourished in Southern California, where
> housing prices rose so rapidly during the bubble that creative
> financing was needed to attract buyers.

> To that end, WaMu embraced so-called option ARMs, adjustable rate
> mortgages that enticed borrowers with a selection of low initial rates
> and allowed them to decide how much to pay each month. But people who
> opted for minimum payments were underpaying the interest due and
> adding to their principal, eventually causing loan payments to
> balloon.

> Customers were often left with the impression that low payments would
> continue long term, according to former WaMu sales agents.

> For WaMu, variable-rate loans — option ARMs, in particular — were
> especially attractive because they carried higher fees than other
> loans, and allowed WaMu to book profits on interest payments that
> borrowers deferred. Because WaMu was selling many of its loans to
> investors, it did not worry about defaults: by the time loans went
> bad, they were often in other hands...

> Click here for full story.

> at 1:02 PM

> Labels: JP Morgan Chase, The New York Times, Washington Mutual

> 1 comments:

> On Jul 4, 2:43 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > Could you simplify all this for me koi....wayyyyyyyyyy toooooooo
> > muuuuuuuuch reading...what are you trying to say in not so many words?

> > On Jul 4, 1:06 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > you-
> > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > Business

> > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at

> The demise of Washington Mutual
> There's a detailed story in today's New York Times about just how
> Washington Mutual sowed the seeds of its own demise. As I read this
> story, I thought, "It's pretty clear to me that many criminals aren't
> in prison -- they're still working in mortgage banking." Apparently
> you have a much higher chance of being sent to prison for a drug-
> related offense in the U.S. than you do for ripping off people in
> various mortgage scams. Welcome to the 21st century! From the story:

> At WaMu, getting the job done meant lending money to nearly anyone who
> asked for it — the force behind the bank’s meteoric rise and its
> precipitous collapse this year in the biggest bank failure in American
> history.

> On a financial landscape littered with wreckage, WaMu, a Seattle-based
> bank that opened branches at a clip worthy of a fast-food chain,
> stands out as a singularly brazen case of lax lending. By the first
> half of this year, the value of its bad loans had reached $11.5
> billion, nearly tripling from $4.2 billion a year earlier.

> Interviews with two dozen former employees, mortgage brokers, real
> estate agents and appraisers reveal the relentless pressure to churn
> out loans that produced such results. While that sample may not fully
> represent a bank with tens of thousands of people, it does reflect the
> views of employees in WaMu mortgage operations in California, Florida,
> Illinois and Texas.

> Their accounts are consistent with those of 89 other former employees
> who are confidential witnesses in a class action filed against WaMu in
> federal court in Seattle by former shareholders...
> Some WaMu employees who worked for the bank during the boom now have
> regrets.

> “It was a disgrace,” said Dana Zweibel, a former financial
> representative at a WaMu branch in Tampa, Fla. “We were giving loans
> to people that never should have had loans.”

> If Ms. Zweibel doubted whether customers could pay, supervisors
> directed her to keep selling, she said.

> “We were told from up above that that’s not our concern,” she said.
> “Our concern is just to write the loan.”...
> WaMu’s boiler room culture flourished in Southern California, where
> housing prices rose so rapidly during the bubble that creative
> financing was needed to attract buyers.

> To that end, WaMu embraced so-called option ARMs, adjustable rate
> mortgages that enticed borrowers with a selection of low initial rates
> and allowed them to decide how much to pay each month. But people who
> opted for minimum payments were underpaying the interest due and
> adding to their principal, eventually causing loan payments to
> balloon.

> Customers were often left with the impression that low payments would
> continue long term, according to former WaMu sales agents.

> For WaMu, variable-rate loans — option ARMs, in particular — were
> especially attractive because they carried higher fees than other
> loans, and allowed WaMu to book profits on interest payments that
> borrowers deferred. Because WaMu was selling many of its loans to
> investors, it did not worry about defaults: by the time loans went
> bad, they were often in other hands...

> Washington Mutual Gives $615,000 Mortgage To Immigrant Making $9 An
> Hour Who Can't Read Or Write English
> By Digger

> Soledad Aviles, an immigrant from Mexico with a 6th grade education
> who can't read or write English and makes $9 an hour, was approved for
> a mortgage of $615, 000 by Washington Mutual. It should be noted off
> the bat that Washington Mutual is one of many banks that accept the
> Matricula Consular ID card as proof of identity and which is easily
> forgable. I assume Aviles is not an illegal alien (but who knows
> considering the source of this story and the fact that they like to
> omit those little tidbits all of the time).

> Soledad Aviles and his wife Guadalupe
> The LA Times gives us his sad story below as he is forced to then rent
> out his house to illegal aliens to make the payments and sleep on a
> couch.
> Washington Mutual should be brought up on charges along with all of
> the people who touched this mortgage and put it through. All those
> living at the residence who are illegal, including Aviles and his wife
> if found to be so, should be deported and the house should be seized
> and sold off at auction with all proceeds going towards the border
> fence, interior enforcement and the prosecution of businesses who hire
> and make loans to illegal aliens.

> The demise of Washington Mutual
> There's a detailed story in today's New York Times about just how
> Washington Mutual sowed the seeds of its own demise. As I read this
> story, I thought, "It's pretty clear to me that many criminals aren't
> in prison -- they're still working in mortgage banking." Apparently
> you have a much higher chance of being sent to prison for a drug-
> related offense in the U.S. than you do for ripping off people in
> various mortgage scams. Welcome to the 21st century! From the story:

> At WaMu, getting the job done meant lending money to nearly anyone who
> asked for it — the force behind the bank’s meteoric rise and its
> precipitous collapse this year in the biggest bank failure in American
> history.

> On a financial landscape littered with wreckage, WaMu, a Seattle-based
> bank that opened branches at a clip worthy of a fast-food chain,
> stands out as a singularly brazen case of lax lending. By the first
> half of this year, the value of its bad loans had reached $11.5
> billion, nearly tripling from $4.2 billion a year earlier.

> Interviews with two dozen former employees, mortgage brokers, real
> estate agents and appraisers reveal the relentless pressure to churn
> out loans that produced such results. While that sample may not fully
> represent a bank with tens of thousands of people, it does reflect the
> views of employees in WaMu mortgage operations in California, Florida,
> Illinois and Texas.

> Their accounts are consistent with those of 89 other former employees
> who are confidential witnesses in a class action filed against WaMu in
> federal court in Seattle by former shareholders...
> Some WaMu employees who worked for the bank during the boom now have
> regrets.

> “It was a disgrace,” said Dana Zweibel, a former financial
> representative at a WaMu branch in Tampa, Fla. “We were giving loans
> to people that never should have had loans.”

> If Ms. Zweibel doubted whether customers could pay, supervisors
> directed her to keep selling, she said.

> “We were told from up above that that’s not our concern,” she said.
> “Our concern is just to write the loan.”...
> WaMu’s boiler room culture flourished in Southern California, where
> housing prices rose so rapidly during the bubble that creative
> financing was needed to attract buyers.

> To that end, WaMu embraced so-called option ARMs, adjustable rate
> mortgages that enticed borrowers with a selection of low initial rates
> and allowed them to decide how much to pay each month. But people who
> opted for minimum payments were underpaying the interest due and
> adding to their principal, eventually causing loan payments to
> balloon.

> Customers were often left with the impression that low payments would
> continue long term, according to former WaMu sales agents.

> For WaMu, variable-rate loans — option ARMs, in particular — were
> especially attractive because they carried higher fees than other
> loans, and allowed WaMu to book profits on interest payments that
> borrowers deferred. Because WaMu was selling many of its loans to
> investors, it did not worry about defaults: by the time loans went
> bad, they were often in other hands...

> Click here for full story.

> at 1:02 PM

> Labels: JP Morgan Chase, The New York Times, Washington Mutual

> 1 comments:

> On Jul 4, 2:43 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > Could you simplify all this for me koi....wayyyyyyyyyy toooooooo
> > muuuuuuuuch reading...what are you trying to say in not so many words?

> > On Jul 4, 1:06 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > you-
> > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > Business

> > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within

> haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > you-
> > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > the bank's IP assets.

> > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > Business

> > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> >http://wamuqd.com/

> > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > it
> > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > Supervision
> > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > insufficient
> > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > seized.
> > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > of September, 2008.

> > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > WaMu.
> > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > the
> > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > negotiated
> > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > plan
> > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > acceleration
> > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > These
> > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > were
> > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > was
> > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > The
> > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > nation,
> > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > draw down.

> > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > its
> > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > they
> > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > known
> > as a bank panic.

> > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > all
> > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > the
> > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> > is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> > banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> > US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> > From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> > premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> > The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> > for
> > creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> > supply
> > side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> > causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> > this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> > called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> > there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> > Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> > corporation whose stockholders are the biggest banks in the country.
> > The Chairman and the six Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
> > are
> > all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This is
> > the legal extent of the Governments involvement with the Federal
> > Reserve. Thus the government has weak control over the actions of the
> > Federal Reserve. All banks in America are members of the Federal
> > Reserve System. All paper money is printed by the Treasury per the
> > amounts ordered by the Federal Reserve. All electronic money, wires,
> > credit cards, debit cards etc and all check book money, is under the
> > monetary policies of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve
> > controls
> > how much money, (cash, electronic, check book) banks have on hand
> > through its regulations and membership requirements. It maintains
> > this
> > flexibility so that it may meet the liquidity demands of banks.

> > WaMu was the largest thrift in America and part of

> dumbass

> On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > you-
> > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > Business

> > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > it
> > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > Supervision
> > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > insufficient
> > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > seized.
> > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > of September, 2008.

> > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > > WaMu.
> > > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > > the
> > > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > > negotiated
> > > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > > plan
> > > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > > acceleration
> > > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > > These
> > > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > > were
> > > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > > was
> > > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > > The
> > > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > > nation,
> > > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > > draw down.

> > > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > > its
> > > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > > they
> > > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > > known
> > > as a bank panic.

> > > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > > all
> > > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > > the
> > > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > > with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> > > is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> > > banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> > > US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> > > From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> > > premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> > > The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> > > for
> > > creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> > > supply
> > > side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> > > causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> > > this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> > > called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> > > there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> > > Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> > > corporation whose stockholders are the biggest banks in the country.
> > > The Chairman and the six Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
> > > are
> > > all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This is
> > > the legal extent of the Governments involvement with the Federal
> > > Reserve. Thus the government has weak control over the actions of the
> > > Federal Reserve. All banks in America are members of the Federal
> > > Reserve System. All paper money is printed by the Treasury per the

> WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > dumbass

> > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > you-
> > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > Business

> > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > it
> > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > Supervision
> > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > insufficient
> > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > seized.
> > > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > > of September, 2008.

> > > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > > > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > > > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > > > WaMu.
> > > > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > > > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > > > the
> > > > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > > > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > > > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > > > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > > > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > > > negotiated
> > > > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > > > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > > > plan
> > > > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > > > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > > > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > > > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > > > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > > > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > > > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > > > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > > > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > > > acceleration
> > > > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > > > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > > > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > > > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > > > These
> > > > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > > > were
> > > > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > > > was
> > > > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > > > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > > > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > > > The
> > > > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > > > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > > > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > > > nation,
> > > > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > > > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > > > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > > > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > > > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > > > draw down.

> > > > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > > > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > > > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > > > its
> > > > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > > > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > > > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > > > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > > > they
> > > > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > > > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > > > known
> > > > as a bank panic.

> > > > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > > > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > > > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > > > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > > > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > > > all
> > > > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > > > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > > > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > > > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > > > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > > > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > > > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > > > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > > > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > > > the
> > > > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > > > with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> > > > is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> > > > banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> > > > US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> > > > From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> > > > premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> > > > The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> > > > for
> > > > creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> > > > supply
> > > > side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> > > > causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> > > > this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> > > > called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> > > > there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> > > > Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> > > > corporation whose stockholders are the biggest banks in the country.
> > > > The Chairman and the six Board of

> www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Y9RU3IprFs

> On Jul 4, 6:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > dumbass

> > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > you-
> > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > Business

> > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > it
> > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > > Supervision
> > > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > > insufficient
> > > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > > seized.
> > > > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > > > of September, 2008.

> > > > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > > > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > > > > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > > > > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > > > > WaMu.
> > > > > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > > > > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > > > > the
> > > > > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > > > > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > > > > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > > > > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > > > > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > > > > negotiated
> > > > > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > > > > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > > > > plan
> > > > > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > > > > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > > > > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > > > > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > > > > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > > > > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > > > > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > > > > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > > > > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > > > > acceleration
> > > > > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > > > > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > > > > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > > > > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > > > > These
> > > > > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > > > > were
> > > > > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > > > > was
> > > > > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > > > > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > > > > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > > > > The
> > > > > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > > > > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > > > > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > > > > nation,
> > > > > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > > > > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > > > > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > > > > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > > > > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > > > > draw down.

> > > > > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > > > > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > > > > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > > > > its
> > > > > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > > > > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > > > > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > > > > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > > > > they
> > > > > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > > > > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > > > > known
> > > > > as a bank panic.

> > > > > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > > > > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > > > > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > > > > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > > > > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > > > > all
> > > > > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > > > > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > > > > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > > > > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > > > > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > > > > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > > > > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > > > > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > > > > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > > > > the
> > > > > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > > > > with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> > > > > is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> > > > > banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> > > > > US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> > > > > From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> > > > > premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> > > > > The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> > > > > for
> > > > > creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> > > > > supply
> > > > > side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> > > > > causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing

> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtIJC3AHnkE&feature=related

> On Jul 4, 4:27 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> >www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Y9RU3IprFs

> > On Jul 4, 6:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > dumbass

> > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > you-
> > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > Business

> > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > > it
> > > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > > > Supervision
> > > > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > > > insufficient
> > > > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > > > seized.
> > > > > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > > > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > > > > of September, 2008.

> > > > > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > > > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > > > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > > > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > > > > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > > > > > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > > > > > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > > > > > WaMu.
> > > > > > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > > > > > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > > > > > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > > > > > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > > > > > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > > > > > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > > > > > negotiated
> > > > > > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > > > > > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > > > > > plan
> > > > > > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > > > > > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > > > > > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > > > > > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > > > > > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > > > > > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > > > > > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > > > > > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > > > > > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > > > > > acceleration
> > > > > > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > > > > > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > > > > > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > > > > > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > > > > > These
> > > > > > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > > > > > were
> > > > > > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > > > > > was
> > > > > > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > > > > > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > > > > > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > > > > > The
> > > > > > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > > > > > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > > > > > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > > > > > nation,
> > > > > > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > > > > > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > > > > > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > > > > > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > > > > > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > > > > > draw down.

> > > > > > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > > > > > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > > > > > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > > > > > its
> > > > > > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > > > > > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > > > > > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > > > > > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > > > > > they
> > > > > > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > > > > > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > > > > > known
> > > > > > as a bank panic.

> > > > > > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > > > > > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > > > > > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > > > > > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > > > > > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > > > > > all
> > > > > > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > > > > > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > > > > > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > > > > > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > > > > > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > > > > > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > > > > > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > > > > > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > > > > > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > > > > > with no more than three being

> WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > dumbass

> > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > you-
> > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > Business

> > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > it
> > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > Supervision
> > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > insufficient
> > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > seized.
> > > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > > of September, 2008.

> > > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > > > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > > > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > > > WaMu.
> > > > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > > > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > > > the
> > > > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > > > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > > > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > > > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > > > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > > > negotiated
> > > > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > > > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > > > plan
> > > > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > > > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > > > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > > > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > > > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > > > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > > > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > > > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > > > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > > > acceleration
> > > > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > > > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > > > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > > > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > > > These
> > > > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > > > were
> > > > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > > > was
> > > > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > > > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > > > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > > > The
> > > > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > > > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > > > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > > > nation,
> > > > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > > > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > > > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > > > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > > > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > > > draw down.

> > > > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > > > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > > > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > > > its
> > > > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > > > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > > > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > > > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > > > they
> > > > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > > > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > > > known
> > > > as a bank panic.

> > > > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > > > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > > > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > > > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > > > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > > > all
> > > > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > > > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > > > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > > > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > > > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > > > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > > > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > > > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > > > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > > > the
> > > > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > > > with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> > > > is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> > > > banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> > > > US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> > > > From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> > > > premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> > > > The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> > > > for
> > > > creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> > > > supply
> > > > side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a problem
> > > > causing bank runs in the recession of 1907. The mechanism for doing
> > > > this is by the banks loaning liquidity to each other in a process
> > > > called Federal Funds, which is short for Federal Reserve Funds. Then
> > > > there is a process of a bank borrowing straight from the Federal
> > > > Reserve called the Discount Window. The Federal Reserve is a private
> > > > corporation whose

> So again......

> WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > dumbass

> > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > you-
> > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > Business

> > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > it
> > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > > Supervision
> > > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > > insufficient
> > > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > > seized.
> > > > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > > > of September, 2008.

> > > > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > > > attention. Both banks received the same treatment simultaneously on
> > > > > September 25th, 2008. For brevity they are usually referred to
> > > > > singularly as the Washington Mutual Bank aka WaMu Bank or WMB or
> > > > > WaMu.
> > > > > For the rest of this text this convention will be followed and they
> > > > > will be referred to as one enterprise and principally referring to
> > > > > the
> > > > > vastly larger Henderson NV incorporated bank.

> > > > > Seventeen days earlier on Monday September 8th, the Board of
> > > > > Washington Mutual removed CEO Kerry Killinger due to losses from
> > > > > subprime mortgages and credit card loans and replaced him with Alan
> > > > > Fishman. WaMu simultaneously announced (link) that they had
> > > > > negotiated
> > > > > a Memorandum of Understanding with the OTS concerning aspects of the
> > > > > bank’s operations. It concluded with this sentence. "The business
> > > > > plan
> > > > > will not require the company to raise capital, increase liquidity or
> > > > > make changes to the products and services it provides to customers."
> > > > > WaMu's new CEO Alan Fishman was experienced in bank mergers. In 2004
> > > > > as CEO of Independence Community Bank Corp he completed a merger with
> > > > > Staten Island Bancorp, Inc and then in 2006 he worked out the well
> > > > > executed sale of Independence Community Bank Corp to Sovereign
> > > > > Bancorp. His employment and hefty salary with WaMu were seen as an
> > > > > indication WaMu was setting itself up for a merger.

> > > > > For the ten days prior to the seizure WaMu experienced an
> > > > > acceleration
> > > > > of withdrawals, and corresponding draw downs in its liquidity, that
> > > > > the regulators at the OTS and FDIC say justified a seizure of the
> > > > > bank. The accounts that withdrew were mostly large retail accounts of
> > > > > over $100,000, which at the time was the FDIC insurance maximum.
> > > > > These
> > > > > accounts were used primarily for payroll purposes. These accounts
> > > > > were
> > > > > mostly in California, where the memory of the IndyMac bank seizure
> > > > > was
> > > > > likely on their minds. The speed and amounts withdrawn do not qualify
> > > > > as a bank run, as a bank run is a complete wipeout of deposits over a
> > > > > few days. At most it could be characterized as a walk on the bank.
> > > > > The
> > > > > withdrawals were done by electronic banking over the internet and by
> > > > > wired funds. It was not in the news, people were not lined up outside
> > > > > the bank. WaMu was the largest thrift or savings & Loan in the
> > > > > nation,
> > > > > and the sixth largest bank by deposits. They had 2,239 branches in 15
> > > > > states, concentrated in the west and south. They were large enough
> > > > > that the Federal Reserve assigned them onsite full time bank
> > > > > inspectors to monitor, among other things, liquidity levels. The
> > > > > Federal Reserve was witness from beginning to end of the liquidity
> > > > > draw down.

> > > > > A walk on a bank, is a mild form of a run on a bank. Bank runs were
> > > > > typical of the great depression which started in 1929. Customers
> > > > > wanted their cash in their hand, because if a bank died and locked
> > > > > its
> > > > > doors, their cash would be forever beyond their reach. Bank runs have
> > > > > an effect on the public and the government that tends to snowball and
> > > > > be a self fulfilling prophecy. If a new bank has a problem, because a
> > > > > bank run has happened recently, it may be happening again now, so
> > > > > they
> > > > > do a run on that bank etc. Bank runs close banks down, and draw their
> > > > > cash down to zero. A slew of bank runs that closes banks down is
> > > > > known
> > > > > as a bank panic.

> > > > > In response to the bank panics of 1929 and the early 1930's, in 1933
> > > > > the government created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
> > > > > (FDIC). The FDIC is a government corporation that provides insurance
> > > > > on bank deposits. The primary reason for creating the FDIC was to
> > > > > prevent bank runs, from the demand side, depositors demanding cash
> > > > > all
> > > > > at once at the bank, which had been the typical bank run scenario in
> > > > > the depression of the early 1930's. The mechanism to do this was
> > > > > deposit insurance so that even if a bank locks its doors, your
> > > > > deposits are covered up to the insurance maximum and you will be paid
> > > > > your money from the insurance fund. At the time of the WaMu seizure
> > > > > the insurance covered up to $100,000. In large part due to the WaMu
> > > > > catastrophe the FDIC has implemented a temporary increase in the
> > > > > amount of deposit insurance, and it is now $250,000 until Dec 31,
> > > > > 2009, unless extended. The Chairman and four Board of Directors of
> > > > > the
> > > > > FDIC are all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
> > > > > with no more than three being from the same political party. The FDIC
> > > > > is self funded through its insurance premiums, which are paid by the
> > > > > banks. The FDIC has an immediate $30 billion line of credit with the
> > > > > US Treasury, and procedures are in place if more credit is needed.
> > > > > From 1996 - 2006 the FDIC waived the collection of the bank insurance
> > > > > premiums as it was at the upper limit of its legal reserves.

> > > > > The Federal Reserve system was created in 1913. One primary reason
> > > > > for
> > > > > creating the Federal Reserve was to prevent bank runs, from the
> > > > > supply
> > > > > side, the running out of cash at the bank, which had been a

> So again......

> WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > dumbass

> > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > you-
> > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > Business

> > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > it
> > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > > Supervision
> > > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > > insufficient
> > > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > > seized.
> > > > > The process of selling and seizing WaMu had actually begun prior to
> > > > > September 15th, reportedly having been started during the first week
> > > > > of September, 2008.

> > > > > Washington Mutual Inc is a bank holding company that owned two banks,
> > > > > the Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, NV and a subsidiary of that
> > > > > bank, Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, Park City, UT. The first mentioned
> > > > > bank was the main banking operation, and the focus of everyone's
> > > > > attention. Both

> And base on this :
> As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> Chase.

> Related
> Special Report

> 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> Photos

> The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> Video

> Madoff Pleads Guilty
> More Related
> Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> Madoff's operation.

> The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> human factor.

> One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> the bank off.

> Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> comment.

> The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> Langford. Langford was not available for comment. Spokesmen for both
> OCC and FinCEN could not comment.

> To a nonbanker, what quickly becomes apparent is that the elaborate
> and formal process for banks' reporting suspicious characters makes it
> quite possible that a quiet, close-to-the-vest player like Madoff who
> is not part of any global crime syndicate could operate comfortably
> for a long time and have a happy bank as his unwitting accomplice.
> Perhaps in this new push to reform bank practices, that process is
> worth revisiting.

> Robert Chew is a former investor with Madoff via a feeder fund. He
> lives in Colorado.

> On Jul 4, 5:09 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > So again......

> > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > dumbass

> > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > you-
> > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > Business

> > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > > it
> > > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > > > Supervision
> > > > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With
> > > > > > insufficient
> > > > > > liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an unsafe and unsound
> > > > > > condition to transact business. The OTS closed the institution and
> > > > > > appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
> > > > > > receiver. The FDIC held the bidding process that resulted in the
> > > > > > acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.” (link). WaMu had been sold and
> > > > > > seized.
> > > > > > The process of

> Angry WAMU bagholders make grassroots protests on social networking
> site:

> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8kpUPlLa58&NR=1

> On Jul 4, 8:20 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > And base on this :
> > As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> > Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> > his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> > them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> > Chase.

> > Related
> > Special Report

> > 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> > Photos

> > The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> > Video

> > Madoff Pleads Guilty
> > More Related
> > Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> > How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> > Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> > Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> > court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> > for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> > of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> > (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> > The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> > shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> > to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> > told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> > account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> > investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> > to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> > One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> > multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> > suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> > Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> > When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> > systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> > anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> > for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> > financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> > that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> > up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> > won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> > Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> > bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> > suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> > One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> > of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> > feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> > arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> > the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> > Madoff's operation.

> > The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> > then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> > out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> > heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> > human factor.

> > One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> > the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> > and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> > from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> > victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> > Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> > in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> > that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> > Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> > were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> > perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> > the bank off.

> > Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> > withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> > transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> > Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> > article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> > comment.

> > The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> > Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> > knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> > it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> > federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> > duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> > overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> > of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> > and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> > must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> > Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> > FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> > report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> > issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> > Langford. Langford was not available for comment. Spokesmen for both
> > OCC and FinCEN could not comment.

> > To a nonbanker, what quickly becomes apparent is that the elaborate
> > and formal process for banks' reporting suspicious characters makes it
> > quite possible that a quiet, close-to-the-vest player like Madoff who
> > is not part of any global crime syndicate could operate comfortably
> > for a long time and have a happy bank as his unwitting accomplice.
> > Perhaps in this new push to reform bank practices, that process is
> > worth revisiting.

> > Robert Chew is a former investor with Madoff via a feeder fund. He
> > lives in Colorado.

> > On Jul 4, 5:09 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > So again......

> > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > dumbass

> > > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > > you-
> > > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > > Business

> > > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > > > Clearly anyone who held WaMu through the day experienced a financial
> > > > > > > wipeout in their position. What caused this wipeout? In a statement
> > > > > > > issued on the night of September 25th the Office of Thrift
> > > > > > > Supervision
> > > > > > > (OTS), an office of the US Treasury, said “An outflow of deposits
> > > > > > > began on September 15, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion. With

> Koi so angry make suckyfucky long time

> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7EPWSsr1Lg

> On Jul 4, 8:22 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > Angry WAMU bagholders make grassroots protests on social networking
> > site:

> >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8kpUPlLa58&NR=1

> > On Jul 4, 8:20 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > And base on this :
> > > As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> > > Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> > > his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> > > them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> > > Chase.

> > > Related
> > > Special Report

> > > 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> > > Photos

> > > The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> > > Video

> > > Madoff Pleads Guilty
> > > More Related
> > > Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> > > How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> > > Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> > > Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> > > court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> > > for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> > > of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> > > (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> > > The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> > > shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> > > to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> > > told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> > > account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> > > investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> > > to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> > > One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> > > multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> > > suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> > > Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> > > When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> > > systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> > > anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> > > for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> > > financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> > > that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> > > up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> > > won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> > > Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> > > bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> > > suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> > > One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> > > of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> > > feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> > > arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> > > the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> > > Madoff's operation.

> > > The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> > > then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> > > out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> > > heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> > > human factor.

> > > One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> > > the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> > > and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> > > from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> > > victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> > > Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> > > in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> > > that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> > > Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> > > were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> > > perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> > > the bank off.

> > > Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> > > withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> > > transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> > > Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> > > article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> > > comment.

> > > The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> > > Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> > > knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> > > it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> > > federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> > > duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> > > overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> > > of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> > > and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> > > must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> > > Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> > > FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> > > report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> > > issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> > > Langford. Langford was not available for comment. Spokesmen for both
> > > OCC and FinCEN could not comment.

> > > To a nonbanker, what quickly becomes apparent is that the elaborate
> > > and formal process for banks' reporting suspicious characters makes it
> > > quite possible that a quiet, close-to-the-vest player like Madoff who
> > > is not part of any global crime syndicate could operate comfortably
> > > for a long time and have a happy bank as his unwitting accomplice.
> > > Perhaps in this new push to reform bank practices, that process is
> > > worth revisiting.

> > > Robert Chew is a former investor with Madoff via a feeder fund. He
> > > lives in Colorado.

> > > On Jul 4, 5:09 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > So again......

> > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > dumbass

> > > > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > > > you-
> > > > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > > > Business

> > > > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after
> > > > > > > > hours. During the regular day it fell 35.5%. For the entire day it
> > > > > > > > fell 93.89%. All these percentages are based on the open, and
> > > > > > > > excluding the pre-market trading data, which I do not have. For the
> > > > > > > > day, the DJIA rose 196.89 points, and closed at 11,022.06

> > > > > > > > Clearly anyone who held

> www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCS5C3UkmMI

> On Jul 4, 7:25 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > Koi so angry make suckyfucky long time

> >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7EPWSsr1Lg

> > On Jul 4, 8:22 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > Angry WAMU bagholders make grassroots protests on social networking
> > > site:

> > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8kpUPlLa58&NR=1

> > > On Jul 4, 8:20 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > And base on this :
> > > > As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> > > > Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> > > > his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> > > > them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> > > > Chase.

> > > > Related
> > > > Special Report

> > > > 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> > > > Photos

> > > > The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> > > > Video

> > > > Madoff Pleads Guilty
> > > > More Related
> > > > Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> > > > How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> > > > Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> > > > Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> > > > court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> > > > for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> > > > of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> > > > (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> > > > The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> > > > shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> > > > to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> > > > told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> > > > account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> > > > investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> > > > to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> > > > One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> > > > multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> > > > suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> > > > Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> > > > When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> > > > systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> > > > anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> > > > for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> > > > financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> > > > that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> > > > up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> > > > won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> > > > Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> > > > bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> > > > suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> > > > One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> > > > of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> > > > feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> > > > arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> > > > the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> > > > Madoff's operation.

> > > > The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> > > > then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> > > > out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> > > > heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> > > > human factor.

> > > > One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> > > > the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> > > > and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> > > > from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> > > > victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> > > > Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> > > > in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> > > > that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> > > > Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> > > > were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> > > > perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> > > > the bank off.

> > > > Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> > > > withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> > > > transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> > > > Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> > > > article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> > > > comment.

> > > > The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> > > > Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> > > > knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> > > > it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> > > > federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> > > > duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> > > > overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> > > > of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> > > > and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> > > > must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> > > > Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> > > > FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> > > > report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> > > > issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> > > > Langford. Langford was not available for comment. Spokesmen for both
> > > > OCC and FinCEN could not comment.

> > > > To a nonbanker, what quickly becomes apparent is that the elaborate
> > > > and formal process for banks' reporting suspicious characters makes it
> > > > quite possible that a quiet, close-to-the-vest player like Madoff who
> > > > is not part of any global crime syndicate could operate comfortably
> > > > for a long time and have a happy bank as his unwitting accomplice.
> > > > Perhaps in this new push to reform bank practices, that process is
> > > > worth revisiting.

> > > > Robert Chew is a former investor with Madoff via a feeder fund. He
> > > > lives in Colorado.

> > > > On Jul 4, 5:09 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > So again......

> > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > dumbass

> > > > > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > > > > you-
> > > > > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > > > > Business

> > > > > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol WM, opened at
> > > > > > > > > $2.62, rose to $2.69 within the first hour, and then fell on average
> > > > > > > > > for the rest of the day and closed at $1.69. In after hours trading
> > > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > > quickly dived without stopping to as low as $0.09 and then closed a
> > > > > > > > > couple hours later at $0.16. Take note it fell 90.5% just in after

> uhm.

> On Jul 4, 8:42 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> >www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCS5C3UkmMI

> > On Jul 4, 7:25 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > Koi so angry make suckyfucky long time

> > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7EPWSsr1Lg

> > > On Jul 4, 8:22 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > Angry WAMU bagholders make grassroots protests on social networking
> > > > site:

> > > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8kpUPlLa58&NR=1

> > > > On Jul 4, 8:20 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > And base on this :
> > > > > As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> > > > > Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> > > > > his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> > > > > them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> > > > > Chase.

> > > > > Related
> > > > > Special Report

> > > > > 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> > > > > Photos

> > > > > The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> > > > > Video

> > > > > Madoff Pleads Guilty
> > > > > More Related
> > > > > Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> > > > > How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> > > > > Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> > > > > Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> > > > > court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> > > > > for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> > > > > of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> > > > > (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> > > > > The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> > > > > shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> > > > > to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> > > > > told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> > > > > account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> > > > > investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> > > > > to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> > > > > One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> > > > > multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> > > > > suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> > > > > Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> > > > > When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> > > > > systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> > > > > anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> > > > > for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> > > > > financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> > > > > that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> > > > > up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> > > > > won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> > > > > Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> > > > > bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> > > > > suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> > > > > One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> > > > > of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> > > > > feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> > > > > arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> > > > > the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> > > > > Madoff's operation.

> > > > > The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> > > > > then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> > > > > out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> > > > > heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> > > > > human factor.

> > > > > One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> > > > > the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> > > > > and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> > > > > from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> > > > > victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> > > > > Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> > > > > in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> > > > > that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> > > > > Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> > > > > were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> > > > > perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> > > > > the bank off.

> > > > > Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> > > > > withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> > > > > transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> > > > > Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> > > > > article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> > > > > comment.

> > > > > The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> > > > > Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> > > > > knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> > > > > it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> > > > > federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> > > > > duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> > > > > overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> > > > > of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> > > > > and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> > > > > must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> > > > > Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> > > > > FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> > > > > report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> > > > > issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> > > > > Langford. Langford was not available for comment. Spokesmen for both
> > > > > OCC and FinCEN could not comment.

> > > > > To a nonbanker, what quickly becomes apparent is that the elaborate
> > > > > and formal process for banks' reporting suspicious characters makes it
> > > > > quite possible that a quiet, close-to-the-vest player like Madoff who
> > > > > is not part of any global crime syndicate could operate comfortably
> > > > > for a long time and have a happy bank as his unwitting accomplice.
> > > > > Perhaps in this new push to reform bank practices, that process is
> > > > > worth revisiting.

> > > > > Robert Chew is a former investor with Madoff via a feeder fund. He
> > > > > lives in Colorado.

> > > > > On Jul 4, 5:09 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > > So again......

> > > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > > On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > dumbass

> > > > > > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > > > > > you-
> > > > > > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > > > > > Business

> > > > > > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol

> uhm.

> On Jul 4, 8:42 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> >www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCS5C3UkmMI

> > On Jul 4, 7:25 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > Koi so angry make suckyfucky long time

> > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7EPWSsr1Lg

> > > On Jul 4, 8:22 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > Angry WAMU bagholders make grassroots protests on social networking
> > > > site:

> > > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8kpUPlLa58&NR=1

> > > > On Jul 4, 8:20 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > And base on this :
> > > > > As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> > > > > Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> > > > > his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> > > > > them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> > > > > Chase.

> > > > > Related
> > > > > Special Report

> > > > > 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> > > > > Photos

> > > > > The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> > > > > Video

> > > > > Madoff Pleads Guilty
> > > > > More Related
> > > > > Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> > > > > How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> > > > > Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> > > > > Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> > > > > court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> > > > > for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> > > > > of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> > > > > (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> > > > > The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> > > > > shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> > > > > to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> > > > > told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> > > > > account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> > > > > investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> > > > > to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> > > > > One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> > > > > multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> > > > > suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> > > > > Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> > > > > When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> > > > > systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> > > > > anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> > > > > for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> > > > > financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> > > > > that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> > > > > up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> > > > > won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> > > > > Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> > > > > bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> > > > > suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> > > > > One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> > > > > of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> > > > > feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> > > > > arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> > > > > the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> > > > > Madoff's operation.

> > > > > The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> > > > > then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> > > > > out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> > > > > heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> > > > > human factor.

> > > > > One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> > > > > the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> > > > > and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> > > > > from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> > > > > victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> > > > > Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> > > > > in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> > > > > that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> > > > > Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> > > > > were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> > > > > perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> > > > > the bank off.

> > > > > Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> > > > > withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> > > > > transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> > > > > Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> > > > > article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> > > > > comment.

> > > > > The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> > > > > Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> > > > > knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> > > > > it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> > > > > federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> > > > > duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> > > > > overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> > > > > of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> > > > > and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> > > > > must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> > > > > Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> > > > > FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> > > > > report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> > > > > issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> > > > > Langford. Langford was not available for comment. Spokesmen for both
> > > > > OCC and FinCEN could not comment.

> > > > > To a nonbanker, what quickly becomes apparent is that the elaborate
> > > > > and formal process for banks' reporting suspicious characters makes it
> > > > > quite possible that a quiet, close-to-the-vest player like Madoff who
> > > > > is not part of any global crime syndicate could operate comfortably
> > > > > for a long time and have a happy bank as his unwitting accomplice.
> > > > > Perhaps in this new push to reform bank practices, that process is
> > > > > worth revisiting.

> > > > > Robert Chew is a former investor with Madoff via a feeder fund. He
> > > > > lives in Colorado.

> > > > > On Jul 4, 5:09 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > > So again......

> > > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > > On Jul 4, 7:17 pm, cool daddy o <technl...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > WaMu win Justice will send BAC to $30 - 40

> > > > > > > So based on the wamu scandal you think bac is going to 30 or 40?

> > > > > > > On Jul 4, 4:08 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > dumbass

> > > > > > > > On Jul 4, 11:54 am, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > > haaaaaaaaaaaaaahaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

> > > > > > > > > On Jul 4, 10:53 am, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > > > > > WaMuhttp://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2009/04/wamu.html
> > > > > > > > > > Washington Mutual (WaMu) is a poster child of the mortgage-lending
> > > > > > > > > > irrational exuberance that led to the current economic depression. A
> > > > > > > > > > run on the bank last September led to its wrenching government-
> > > > > > > > > > mandated rescue by JP Morgan Chase. WaMu was the biggest bank failure
> > > > > > > > > > in U.S. history, and was sold in a hastily arranged wamu-bam-thank-
> > > > > > > > > > you-
> > > > > > > > > > man auction. WaMu is now suing the FDIC, for selling it off for only
> > > > > > > > > > $1.9 billion, claiming it had no such right. Meanwhile, JP Morgan has
> > > > > > > > > > filed its own suit, seeking title to disputed WaMu assets, including
> > > > > > > > > > its tiny portfolio of eight patents granted and pending, as well as
> > > > > > > > > > over 300 domestic and international trademarks, and 1,300 Web domain
> > > > > > > > > > names. The Delaware district court judge handling WaMu's bankruptcy
> > > > > > > > > > case has given WaMu permission to hire a consulting firm to valuate
> > > > > > > > > > the bank's IP assets.

> > > > > > > > > > Posted by Patent Hawk at April 16, 2009 10:11 PM | Patents In
> > > > > > > > > > Business

> > > > > > > > > > Commentshttp://wamustory.com/

> > > > > > > > > >http://wamuqd.com/

> > > > > > > > > > Posted by: HROLLER at April 20, 2009 2:11 PM

> > > > > > > > > > On Thursday September 25th 2008, Washington Mutual Inc aka WaMu Inc.
> > > > > > > > > > or WMI or WaMu, common shares trading under the symbol

> www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_fUmx-HI0Q

> On Jul 4, 7:48 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > uhm.

> > On Jul 4, 8:42 pm, Woody Woodpeck <dothea...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > >www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCS5C3UkmMI

> > > On Jul 4, 7:25 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > Koi so angry make suckyfucky long time

> > > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7EPWSsr1Lg

> > > > On Jul 4, 8:22 pm, Kerry <kerryrei...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > Angry WAMU bagholders make grassroots protests on social networking
> > > > > site:

> > > > >http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C8kpUPlLa58&NR=1

> > > > > On Jul 4, 8:20 pm, koi <takamiyada...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > > > And base on this :
> > > > > > As Bernard Madoff passes time as inmate No. 61727-054 in the
> > > > > > Metropolitan Correctional Center in lower Manhattan, questions about
> > > > > > his giant scheme continue to dog investigators and the public. Among
> > > > > > them is the curious relationship Madoff had with his bank, JPMorgan
> > > > > > Chase.

> > > > > > Related
> > > > > > Special Report

> > > > > > 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis
> > > > > > Photos

> > > > > > The Demise of Bernard Madoff
> > > > > > Video

> > > > > > Madoff Pleads Guilty
> > > > > > More Related
> > > > > > Irving Picard at Center of Post-Madoff Storm
> > > > > > How Madoff’s Feeder Funds Stole My Retirement
> > > > > > Wall Street’s Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with Fraud

> > > > > > Madoff never used his asset-management money to trade securities,
> > > > > > court documents show. Instead, he largely kept it in his Chase account
> > > > > > for years. Though Chase bankers never raised a red flag, another arm
> > > > > > of Chase did have suspicions about Madoff, and that raises questions.
> > > > > > (See pictures of the demise of Bernard Madoff.)

> > > > > > The Chase account, Madoff said in court in mid-March, was used to
> > > > > > shuttle money back and forth between his U.S. and London operations,
> > > > > > to make it appear he was executing trades in European markets, as he
> > > > > > told federal regulators. Madoff made no trades at all with his Chase
> > > > > > account, but rather just collected investor monies, wrote checks to
> > > > > > investors, and took money for himself. In court, Madoff pleaded guilty
> > > > > > to 11 counts of fraud, from wire transfer to money-laundering.

> > > > > > One puzzler for money chasers in Madoff's $65 billion Ponzi is why the
> > > > > > multibillion-dollar bank account he kept at Chase never came under
> > > > > > suspicion by internal bank compliance systems or managers in charge of
> > > > > > Madoff's account. (Watch TIME's video about Madoff's trial.)

> > > > > > When it comes to technology that scans for fraud, today's detection
> > > > > > systems are largely focused on identity theft, hackers and account
> > > > > > anomalies, according to Don Jackson, director of threat intelligence
> > > > > > for Atlanta-based SecureWorks, information-security experts on
> > > > > > financial cyberthreat. "The problem with financial-fraud technology is
> > > > > > that it's only as good as how it's set up," Jackson says. "If it's set
> > > > > > up for a high-volume and multiple-wire-transfers account, then it
> > > > > > won't reveal anything strange when there's lots of activity, like
> > > > > > Madoff's account. The only way to stop this kind of fraud is for the
> > > > > > bank to know its client better and to report things that might be
> > > > > > suspicious. It really comes down to human control."

> > > > > > One thing that should have raised suspicions is that the bank's review
> > > > > > of its own investments caused it to pull $250 million from a Madoff
> > > > > > feeder fund, Fairfield Greenwich, just months before Madoff was
> > > > > > arrested. Chase took this action because it became "concerned about
> > > > > > the lack of transparency," and its due diligence "raised doubts" about
> > > > > > Madoff's operation.

> > > > > > The notion a bank can be concerned about investments with Madoff and
> > > > > > then be unconcerned by the same man's vast sums of cash flowing in and
> > > > > > out of the same bank has experts and lawyers still shaking their
> > > > > > heads. Others see it as a classic breakdown between technology and the
> > > > > > human factor.

> > > > > > One lawyer, Howard Kleinhendler, of Wachtel & Masyr LLP, is following
> > > > > > the money trail and believes Madoff's Chase account was "suspicious"
> > > > > > and should have been shut down the moment the bank pulled its funds
> > > > > > from Fairfield Greenwich. Kleinhendler represents a dozen Madoff
> > > > > > victims. (Read "Madoff Victims Look for Ways to Recover Their Money.")

> > > > > > Moreover, Kleinhendler believes Chase abruptly pulled its $250 million
> > > > > > in August, when, he says, "it learned from Bear Stearns executives
> > > > > > that Madoff's investments were phony." JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear
> > > > > > Stearns in March 2008. "Bear Stearns had done deals with Madoff. They
> > > > > > were on boards together," Kleinhendler says, and therefore, he posits,
> > > > > > perhaps executives at Bear knew Madoff's business was fishy and tipped
> > > > > > the bank off.

> > > > > > Chase asserts that its withdrawal was normal procedure. The bank
> > > > > > withdrew the $250 million when it "became concerned about the lack of
> > > > > > transparency to some questions we posed as part of our review," said
> > > > > > Chase spokeswoman Kristin Lemkau in a January 2008 New York Times
> > > > > > article. A Chase spokesman did not comment further. Fairfield had no
> > > > > > comment.

> > > > > > The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
> > > > > > Terrorism Act of 2001 makes it illegal for a bank to accept funds it
> > > > > > knows, or has reason to believe, were derived from fraud. In addition,
> > > > > > it's obliged to report its suspicions to authorities. A tangle of
> > > > > > federal and state agencies could investigate such potential banking
> > > > > > duplicity, but for national banks like JPMorgan Chase the first
> > > > > > overseer is the Department of the Treasury's Office of the Comptroller
> > > > > > of Currency. OCC examiners conduct on-site reviews of national banks
> > > > > > and provide supervision of bank operations. For OCC to investigate, it
> > > > > > must first get a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from the Financial
> > > > > > Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), also part of Treasury. But for
> > > > > > FinCEN to act, it must receive a confidential SAR from a bank. No
> > > > > > report, no investigation. In the case of JPMorgan Chase, SARs are
> > > > > > issued by the director of global anti-money-laundering, William
> > > > > > Langford. Langford was not a